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Two weapons today threaten freedom in our world. One—the 100-megaton 
hydrogen bomb—requires vast resources of technology, effort and money. It is an 
ultimate weapon of civilized and scientific man. The other—a nail and a piece of 
wood buried in a rice paddy—is deceptively simple, the weapon of a peasant. 
  —Lt. Col. T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him (1962) 
Counterinsurgency is another word for brotherly love. 
  —attributed to Edward Lansdale 
In the 1930s handbook for British imperial officers, Imperial Policing, Maj. Gen. 
Charles Gwynn, who had seen action in both West Africa and Sudan, writes: 
When armed rebellion occurs, it presents a very different military problem from 
that of a deliberate small-war campaign. There is an absence of a definite 
objective, and  the conditions are those of guerrilla warfare, in which elusive rebel 
bands must be hunted down and protective measures are needed to deprive them 
of opportunities. The admixture of rebels with a neutral or loyal element of the 
population adds to the difficulties of the task. Excessive severity may antagonize 
this element, add to the number of the rebels and leave a lasting feeling of 
resentment and bitterness. On the   other hand, the power and resolution of the 
government forces must be displayed. Anything which can be interpreted as 
weakness encourages those who are sitting on  the fence to keep on good terms 
with the rebels. 
Gwynn distinguishes the policing role of occupying powers from conventional 
warfare and even from asymmetric “small wars” against irregulars, which he 
defines as “deliberate campaigns with a definite military objective, but 
undertaken with the ultimate object of establishing civil control” and in which “[no] 
limitations are placed on the amount of force which can be legitimately exercised, 
and the Army is free to employ all the weapons the nature of the terrain 
permits.”[1] Pitched closer to civil governance, policing occurs where the 
government expects to continue ruling a population after hostilities have ended 
and, as such, wishes to avoid antagonizing the civilians from whom nascent rebel 
groups can recruit members and receive logistical and moral support. 
The precise calibration of lethal force advocated in Imperial Policing is embraced 
as the primary tactic of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine in the United 
States, as most clearly set out in the Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual (2006),[2] whose free Army-published online version has been 
downloaded by over 2 million people.[3] Since the Manual’s dissemination, which 
roughly coincided with the 2007 “surge” in Iraq, counterinsurgency doctrine has 
become a cottage industry with numerous admirers in the press corps. A key 
achievement of counterinsurgency doctrine, in fact, has been to bring the 
majority of American foreign and military affairs reporters back on board the 
careening bandwagon of Washington’s post-September 11 wars. 
The Soldier-Scholars 
Counterinsurgency doctrine is interpreted, expanded and sometimes challenged 
in the proliferation of publications and blogs dedicated to the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. One widely read blog is known by its URL, taches d’huile (oil spots), 
named after the anti-guerrilla tactic invented by French general Joseph Gallieni in 
the late nineteenth century. Gallieni’s idea was that, rather than pushing forward 
across a broad front, the occupying army would gradually and evenly expand its 
control outward from a central stronghold, as oil spreads on paper. Other prolific 
bloggers include Abu Muqawama (nom de plume of Andrew Exum, an ex-Army 
Ranger who is completing a doctoral thesis on Lebanese Hizballah) and 
former Washington Post journalist Tom Ricks. Among the authors of books and 
articles are a number of active and retired military officers who publish in a range 
of venues, from Military Review and Small Wars Journal to think tank occasional 
papers series and, increasingly, university and trade press monographs. Crucially 
for counterinsurgency doctrine’s cachet, many of these authors are soldier-
scholars. Among those brandishing doctorates are Brig. Gen. H. R. McMaster 
(North Carolina, history), retired Col. Conrad Crane (Stanford, history), retired 
Col. Peter Mansoor (Ohio State, military history), retired Lt. Col. John Nagl 
(Oxford, international relations), retired Col. Kalev Sepp (Harvard, history) and 
retired Lt. Col. David Kilcullen of the Australian army (New South Wales, politics). 
Then there is Gen. David Petraeus (Princeton, international relations), the 
motivating force behind the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the only general of 
the post-September 11 wars whose name is bruited for the presidency. 
Petraeus is in such favor because the surge is widely seen to have “worked,” 
allowing the military and the media to shift their attention from Iraq to 
Afghanistan. The works of Kilcullen, Nagl and Sepp, along with Ricks, have been 
highly influential in establishing this metanarrative, and also in providing 
blueprints for soldiers, commanders and civilian officials on how to fight 
asymmetric wars against non-uniformed guerrillas now and in the future. 
Significantly, the admiration for counterinsurgency doctrine crosses partisan lines 
and is touted as progressive by many liberal interventionists in Europe and North 
America.[4] Sarah Sewall, former director of the Carr Center for Human Rights 
Policy at Harvard University, was involved in drafting the Manual and wrote the 
introduction to the press edition. Such humanitarian types focus on 
counterinsurgency’s emphasis (now a cliché) on “winning hearts and minds,” as 
well as its “restraint” and even “political correctness.” 
What makes the Counterinsurgency Field Manual and its cohort an ostensible 
repository of progressive intent is related to what distinguishes counterinsurgency 
from conventional warfare. In conventional warfare, as T. E. Lawrence (“of 
Arabia”) wrote, opposing armies are each “striving into touch to avoid tactical 
surprise.” Guerrillas, by contrast, “might be a vapour.” Their weapons are not 
firepower but “speed and time.”[5] To wit, they can move faster than large 
armies and they can hold out longer. It is not surprising that Mao, perhaps the 
greatest theoretician of guerrilla warfare, stressed “protracted war” or that the 
Pentagon speaks of today’s overseas missions as “the long war.” In such wars, 
Mao went on, guerrilla leaders must strengthen “the relationship that should exist 
between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water, the 
latter to the fish that inhabit it.”[6] 
The US military now makes a further distinction between “enemy-centric” and 
“population-centric” counterinsurgencies. The former, what Gwynn called “small 
wars,” is the attempt to defeat the guerrilla by killing him and using punitive 
measures to deter the civilian population from supporting him. Such a campaign 
was waged in the “Sunni triangle” of Iraq in 2003-2004, succeeding mostly in 
multiplying the number of insurgents. The latter, as promulgated by the Manual, 
is about persuading the civilians that the counterinsurgent army can best shield 
them from hardship. This approach, beloved of liberals for its emphasis on 
“protection,” is of course aimed primarily at defeating the guerrilla, by literally 
starving him of shelter, food and medical supplies. 
“Armed Social Work” 
David Kilcullen argues precisely this point in his first and most widely read piece, 
“Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” 
self-consciously modeled on Lawrence’s advice for mobilizing Arabs in World War 
I but drawing as well on his own doctoral “fieldwork” as a serving officer in 
Indonesia. Some of Kilcullen’s guidance for ground commanders has to do with 
inter-agency cooperation, knowledge of the locale or motivations for insurgency. 
The core of the article, however, is concerned with how the counterinsurgent 
should interact with civilians: 
This is the true meaning of the phrase “hearts and minds,” which comprises 
two   separate components. “Hearts” means persuading people their best 
interests are   served by your success; “minds” means convincing them that you 
can protect them and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept 
has to do with whether  people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is 
what counts. 
The article emphasizes the importance of building relations with community 
leaders, local NGOs and police. Counterinsurgency is “armed social work,” and 
depends not only on the fighting abilities of the occupying military, but also on 
performing for local and international audiences, presenting a “unified narrative” 
that can counter nationalist sentiments and “coopting neutral or friendly women, 
through targeted social and economic programs.”[7] 
Kilcullen’s heralded volume The Accidental Guerrilla expands on these ideas. He 
presents a series of cases—Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia and 
even Europe—through which he contends that insurgents’ strategies aim to 
provoke their opponents, intimidate the locals and prolong the conflict in order to 
“exhaust their opponents’ resources.” He identifies a “pathology” whereby 
infection, contagion, intervention and rejection form a cycle named “the 
accidental guerrilla syndrome.” The accidental guerrillas are the ostensibly neutral 
civilians who wind up “fighting alongside extremist forces not because they 
support takfiri ideology but because they oppose outside interference in their 
affairs.”[8] Some of this statement rings true—native populations do tend to 
resist foreign occupiers. But it is another point that has become the 
counterinsurgency truism. In his analysis of the Afghan counterinsurgency, 
Kilcullen says: 
Counterinsurgency theory, as well as field observation, suggests that a minority 
of the population will support the government come what may, and another 
minority will back the Taliban under any circumstance, but the majority of 
Afghans simply want security, peace and prosperity and will swing to support the 
side that appears most   likely to prevail and to meet these needs, and that most 
closely aligns with their  primary group identity.[9] 
Kilcullen is rephrasing a “basic tenet of the exercise of political power” put 
forward by French counterinsurgency expert David Galula, a veteran of colonial 
Algeria’s wars who is regularly and vociferously declared to be the forefather of 
US counterinsurgency effort today. Galula writes: “In any situation, whatever the 
cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an 
active minority against the cause. The technique of power consists in relying on 
the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or 
eliminate the hostile minority.”[10] Aside from the fact that Kilcullen minimizes 
the latter portion of the formula, his entire book seems to pivot on this 
Machiavellian understanding of politics. 
“Be Polite” 
The Galula/Kilcullen thesis finds its academic counterpart in Stathis Kalyvas’ 
vaunted The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Interestingly, rather than calling a 
counterinsurgency operation by that name, Kalyvas uses the conceptual 
framework of civil war, thus obscuring the most important element of 
counterinsurgency: the asymmetry of power between occupying forces and 
guerrilla groups. In this sophisticated, extensively sourced book, the central case 
is the Greek state’s suppression of the Communist insurgency in the 1940s. In 
order to emphasize the “civil war” element, Kalyvas neglects to mention that the 
US provided Greece with $467 million in military aid, a “flood of arms and 
equipment” and a corps of military advisers under the auspices of the Truman 
Doctrine.[11] 
Like Galula and Kilcullen, Kalyvas sees two methods that can win over a neutral 
population: deterrence through intimidation or persuasion through protection. His 
main argument is that civilian support for one of the sides is neither ideological 
nor political. In asymmetric warfare, civilians can be detached from such 
considerations through domination of the battlespace, though their allegiances 
may remain in flux throughout the period of fighting. In Kalyvas’ words, “control 
is increasingly likely to shape collaboration because political actors who enjoy 
substantial territorial control can protect civilians who live in that 
territory.”[12] Although convincing as regards the transformative effects of 
violence, Kalyvas transforms violence into the raison d’etre of conflict. There is no 
power ascribed to memory, history or ideals of justice, except in so far as one 
side or another can use these things instrumentally. 
The process by which the “protection” of a population can work is complex and, 
Kilcullen suggests, requires a root-and-branch transformation of both military and 
political practice. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual lays out the steps taken in 
the field, including integration of civilian and military activities, judicious use of 
intelligence and “information operations,” population control, provision of 
essential services and economic development, and training of local police. 
Kilcullen’s proposals are more strategic in nature. He suggests developing a new 
disciplinary approach to this form of conflict—not international relations, but 
anthropology, which he defines as “the study of social roles, groups, status, 
institutions and relations within human population groups, often in non-elite, non-
state-based frameworks.” He further posits that US grand strategy has to choose 
between containment and intervention and between military and non-military 
spending, to decide what the acceptable costs are “in resources and lives,” and to 
determine which geographic areas are high-priority. Kilcullen wants the imbalance 
between US military and non-military capabilities remedied and US “soft power” 
reinforced. In a sense, he would like to see sovereign power (defined by Foucault 
as “the power over life and death”) give way to a panoply of disciplinary 
capacities, including “cultural and ethnographic intelligence, social systems 
analysis, information operations, early-entry or high-threat humanitarian or 
governance teams, field negotiation and mediation teams, biometric 
reconnaissance and a variety of other strategically useful capabilities.”[13] But 
sovereign power is to be kept in reserve. Or, as fellow warrior-solon John Nagl 
half-jokingly said on The Daily Show, counterinsurgency means, “Be polite, be 
professional, be prepared to kill.” 
Of Boers and Boy Scout Troops 
Counterinsurgency doctrine gets reverent treatment from the media, in part 
because it seems to originate in the uniformed military’s sprawling network of war 
colleges and institutes of specialized study rather than universities or think tanks. 
Nagl and his colleagues cannot be derided, as the neo-conservative intellectuals 
were, as “chicken hawks.” But counterinsurgency doctrine is firmly ensconced in 
civilian Washington, and its American Enterprise Institute is the Center for a New 
American Security (CNAS), of which Nagl is now president. The chief executive 
officer is Nathaniel Fick, a veteran of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars whose 
book One Bullet Away (2005) is reportedly required reading for Marine cadets. 
Andrew Exum and Tom Ricks have offices at CNAS; Kilcullen is a non-resident 
senior fellow. CNAS was founded in 2007 by Kurt Campbell and Michele Flournoy, 
who now serve in the Obama State and Defense Departments, respectively. It is 
not coincidental to counterinsurgency doctrine’s ascendancy that it is linked to the 
right wing of the Democratic Party, the paladins of the status quo who, because 
the American media dubs them “centrist” and “middle-of-the-road,” are thought 
to be non-ideological. (“I could go there without being branded,” one journalist 
with a temporary perch at CNAS told The Nation.[14]) 
The CNAS president, Nagl, has also done a great deal to lend a scholarly sheen to 
the concept of population-centric counterinsurgency. He has, for instance, helped 
to spread what has become an unquestioned verity among his peers, that the 
suppression of Communist guerrilla warfare in British Malaya (1948-1960) is 
proof that great power wars against irregulars need not be quagmires.[15] In 
Malaya, the story goes, the guerrillas were vanquished, the civilian population 
was deterred from supporting them and the regime that replaced imperial British 
rule was decidedly friendly to British interests. 
When the Communist guerrillas began their struggle, they were supported 
logistically and morally by “squatters”—landless workers of Chinese extraction in 
the rubber plantations and tin mines owned by the British—whose communities 
dotted the jungles. A state of emergency was declared, and British units from 
elsewhere, including British members of the Palestine Police who had lost their 
jobs with the establishment of the Israeli state, were flown into Malaya in large 
numbers. A three-pronged plan was put into action to suppress the revolt. In the 
cities, emergency regulations were used to silence critics (particularly of Chinese 
extraction) and to send potential “agitators” to detention camps; significant 
numbers of Chinese residents considered troublesome were also 
deported.[16] Military units, aided by contingents of trackers from other parts of 
the empire, were sent into the jungle to fight the guerrillas. Perhaps most 
significantly, the British moved to sever the connection between the civilians and 
the guerrillas. They engineered the resettlement of 500,000 squatters into “New 
Villages” and some 600,000 laborers into “controlled areas”—still near the tin 
mines and rubber plantations to ensure a steady supply of labor, but with these 
compounds surrounded by barbed wire and guard towers, accessible via military 
checkpoints and heavily monitored.[17] Food denial operations rationed the 
victuals of New Village and controlled area residents to ensure they passed none 
on to the guerrillas.[18] The areas from which the squatters had been evacuated 
were declared “black areas,” free-fire zones in which the police and army were 
free to “shoot anything that moved.”[19] Conditions in the New Villages were dire; 
vegetables and other crops had been uprooted, old households burned down, 
animals slaughtered, and the new land could scarcely support agriculture because 
of extensive rubber farming. The guards manhandled the residents, and 
missionaries were invited only eventually to provide health care and education. 
Where electricity was introduced, it was to power the floodlights used for 
surveillance of the villages.[20] In effect, these procedures succeeded in 
depriving the guerrillas in the jungles of intelligence, information, support, food 
and medicine. 
Alongside innovations in tactics and “psy-ops” (i.e., psychological operations, or 
what is now called information operations), Nagl attributes the success of 
Malayan counterinsurgency to this resettlement of civilians, which he credits to 
the “strategic directions” of British colonial officials. In addition, he sees the 
lessons of the Malayan counterinsurgency to be decentralization of anti-guerrilla 
military action, “protection” of civilians and extensive gathering of intelligence, all 
guaranteed by the British military’s flexibility and capacity for organizational 
learning. Extraordinarily, Nagl sees the New Villages as benign institutions, “more 
than concentration camps” hosting village cooperatives and “even Boy Scout 
Troops.” They are the emblem of population-centric counterinsurgency. Nagl 
admiringly cites Harold Briggs, the British Army’s director of operations in Malaya: 
The problem of clearing Communist banditry from Malaya was similar to that of 
eradicating malaria from a country. Flit guns and mosquito nets, in the form 
of   military and police, though some very local security if continuously 
maintained,  effected no permanent cure. Such a permanent cure entails the 
closing of all breeding  areas. In this case the breeding areas of the Communists 
were the isolated squatter areas.[21] 
Setting aside whatever qualms one may have about the immediate violence done 
to those 1 million civilians, or their long-term traumas, Nagl’s celebration of 
“population control” is incoherent. After all, the New Villages are the direct 
descendants of the concentration camps the British set up for Boers and black 
Africans starting in 1900. In the Boer war, the language of protection and refuge 
was used to herd hundreds of thousands of civilians into barren compounds after 
their farms and houses were ordered torched by Lord Kitchener.[22] In 
counterinsurgency doctrine, however, Boer war tactics are held up as enemy-
centric (with an odor of disapproval wafting from the term),[23] while the New 
Villages are considered sources of emulation for practitioners of humane, 
population-centric quashing of rebellion. In fact, in Kalev Sepp’s heavily cited 
“Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” what he euphemizes as “electrified rural 
villages” are placed alongside mass citizenship and elevation of the role of women 
as basic determinants of the success of counterinsurgency.[24] It is noteworthy 
that Nagl, so enthusiastic about New Villages, barely touches on their direct 
descendants in Vietnam, the strategic hamlets. While recognizing the family 
connection of the two concepts, he simply attributes strategic hamlets’ failure to 
“overly enthusiastic implementation effort that created new hamlets before the 
old ones had been pacified.”[25] Instead, Nagl sees in local militias created by 
the CIA and the Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons (which wedded patrolling 
to “civic action”) routes to salvation not taken by a top brass infatuated with 
conventional, offensive warfare.[26] 
The writings on Malaya or Vietnam rarely comment on the massive dislocation 
caused by the New Villages and strategic hamlets, or the intrusiveness of the 
population control measures and their systematic violation of human rights—not 
to mention norms of justice. The British campaign was, in fact, an exercise in 
collective punishment that sought not to “protect,” but to divide and rule. At their 
most “civic,” US forces in Vietnam similarly attempted social engineering in the 
Vietnamese countryside through displacement on an immense scale. 
Tribes Without Flags 
Indeed, it is an abiding interest in divisions of sect, ethnicity, tribe and clan, 
alongside the tactics of population control, that defines counterinsurgency 
practice as passed down from the twentieth century to the twenty-first. In a 1906 
memo intended for British imperial officials, Lord Lugard, the chief theoretician of 
indirect rule, writes: 
Since the Fulani Chiefs are aliens who won their position by conquest, it would 
not,  of course, be surprising if the bulk of the people, seeing that the Fulani 
power hasbeen broken by the British, were no longer to accord to the Chiefs the 
obedience and  respect which they had hitherto exacted…. I am anxious in every 
possible way to counteract this tendency, and to support the authority of the 
Native Chiefs, though I  consider that it is necessary to retain the means of 
enforcing order—viz., the Military and Police forces—solely under Government at 
present, and probably for some time   to come.[27] 
Bolstering the powers of local chieftains was profoundly important to the indirect 
rule, or “dual mandate,” methods employed by the British in so much of their 
empire. (The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa was Lugard’s best-known 
tome.) Just as significant was the reduction of local (or native) political structures 
and relations to a mosaic of tribes (or communities) that could be bought off or 
manipulated to fit military and political exigencies. Classifying the inscrutable 
natives into tribes rendered them legible to colonial eyes. 
It is instructive to compare two texts about the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, one written at the end of the nineteenth century by a British colonel and 
the second at the beginning of the twenty-first century by an American major. 
Sometime in the 1880s, Col. R. J. Marker delivered a lecture on the Northwest 
Frontier, then part of British India, and now the locus in Pakistan of the various 
Pashtun militias of which the Taliban is one. Marker wrote that “the semi-
independent Tribes” of this mountainous zone “have no common binding 
influence except that of the jehad or holy war, and in peaceful times spend the 
greater part of an uneventful existence in inter-tribal feuds or attempts to murder 
a fellow clansman with whom they have a blood quarrel. Should the cause of 
religion lead them to combine against a common infidel enemy, they could turn 
out not less than 200,000 of the finest guerrilla fighters and marksmen in the 
world, an increasing proportion of which number is daily becoming armed with 
weapons of precision and modern range, owing to the developments of the gun-
running trade through Persia and Afghanistan.”[28] Marker suggests the use of 
an “irregular corps” of local fighters to subdue these tribes one by one. His essay 
includes a sort of proto-ethnography of the tribes, measuring the susceptibility of 
each kinship group to alliance with and obeisance to British imperial power. 
Flash forward to 2009, when US veterans of the post-September 11 wars had 
begun to commit their own proto-ethnographies to paper. A latter-day Marker, 
Maj. Jim Gant of the Army’s Special Forces, describes the political landscape of 
Afghanistan as being 
constituted of tribes. Not individuals, not Western-style citizens—but tribes and 
tribesmen.… Tribes understand protection. Tribes are organized and run to ensure 
the security of the tribe. Not only physical security, but revenue and land 
protection. But   most important of all is preservation of the tribal name and 
reputation.... When honor   is at stake, tribal members stop at nothing to 
preserve their tribe’s integrity and “face.” [T]ribes understand power. How many 
guns do we have? How many warriors can I put in the field? Can I protect my 
tribe? Can I attack others who threaten my  tribe? Can I back my words or 
decisions up with the ability to come down the valley  and kill you? Can I keep 
you from killing me? Lastly, tribes understand projection.   Tribes have no 
“strategic goals” in the Western sense. Their diplomatic, informational,  military 
and economic priorities are almost without exception in reference to 
other  tribes.[29] 
US officials take Gant so seriously that this “Lawrence of Afghanistan” is being 
sent there to implement his vision of tribal control.[30] The same faith in the 
explanatory power of tribes also underpinned the US surge in Iraq, even if that 
policy came with considerably more window dressing about “hearts and 
minds.”[31] 
Back on Board 
While the surge has many champions, its master hagiographer is Tom Ricks, 
whose The Gamble is so complete in its advocacy of the new counterinsurgency 
orthodoxy that its cast of characters, narrative arc and subtle norms have passed 
into mainstream lore. In a way, The Gamble is meant to sear shut the wound to 
the US military’s honor that was gouged by Ricks himself in his earlier account of 
the first phase of the Iraq war, Fiasco. In Fiasco, Ricks tells not only the familiar 
tale of bad faith on the part of the Bush White House, but also a narrative of 
incompetence and cruelty among the ranks of American soldiers, from the top 
generals on down. The problem, as Ricks sees it, was that US forces in Iraq were 
violating “at least three” of the four rules put forward by Charles Gwynn 
in Imperial Policing: “Civil power must be in charge, civilian and military 
authorities must cooperate relentlessly, action must be firm and timely, but when 
force is required it should be used minimally.”[32] By contrast, The Gamble, 
which covers the years 2006-2008, is the story of how the US military in Iraq 
began to obey the rules of effective counterinsurgency. 
In Ricks’ account, two of the most significant early steps in the counterinsurgency 
effort were, first, to “recognize” Iraq’s “tribal” character and, second, to prise 
open fissures in the hostile opposition’s ranks. With regard to the former, he 
applauds the “insight” of a US general who idolized the British imperial officer, 
Gertrude Bell. The general asserted that “tribal society makes up the tectonic 
plates in Iraq on which everything rests.”[33] As for the latter, Ricks writes of the 
commander of US military forces in Ramadi and his Arabic-speaking right-hand 
man, whose approach was to separate the “tribes” from the insurgents: 
“Together they tried to sort out who was a real sheik, with big wasta, or influence 
and who was a lightweight.”[34] In turn, this tribal chieftain was paid and given 
some autonomy of action in order that he and his followers challenge insurgent 
groups. Here, the officers were following an edict of the Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual to “remain alert for signs of divisions within an insurgent movement,” 
since “rifts between insurgent leaders, if identified, can be exploited.”[35] 
Ricks also approvingly tells the story of the cooptation of civilians as advisers to 
senior military officers. Petraeus’ adviser in Iraq was a Palestinian-American 
Arabic speaker and “schmoozer,” Sa‘di ‘Uthman, while Gen. Ray Odierno’s adviser 
was an Arabic-speaking British humanitarian worker, Emma Sky, who has been 
compared to Bell herself.[36] In an eerie echo of British imperial policies, these 
“native informants” and renegade civilians, ostensibly sympathetic to the locals 
but ultimately loyal to the empire, provided a pathway for local knowledge, a 
velvet glove of joviality and compassion for the mailed fist and, most importantly, 
a more disciplinary (rather than overtly coercive) form of governance. 
Despite the adulatory tone of the book, Ricks is fully aware that the US presence 
in Iraq has persisted far longer than envisioned. Few advocates of 
counterinsurgency comment on how it has become the long-term replacement for 
policies of direct action, ostensibly handing over control to locals, reducing the 
number of US troops, and all the while polishing modes of indirect rule. Ricks has, 
indeed, been the main publicist of the omnipresent question attributed to 
Petraeus, “How does this end?” In The Gamble, Ricks writes that “the best 
answer” came from a Petraeus adviser who said, “I don't think [this 
counterinsurgency] does end…. We are going to be in this centrally located Arab 
state for a long time. There will be some US presence, and some relationship with 
Iraqis, for decades.”[37] This answer is in line with the strategic vision of Gen. 
Jack Keane, the man credited with persuading Petraeus to back the surge. 
According to the consummate insider journalist Bob Woodward, Keane told 
Petraeus: “We’re going to be here [in the greater Middle East] for 50 years 
minimum, most of the time hopefully preventing wars, and on occasion having to 
fight one, dealing with radical Islam, our economic interests in the region and 
trying to achieve stability…. We’re going to do it anyway because we don’t have a 
choice.”[38] But geopolitics is not Ricks’ concern. He promotes counterinsurgency 
as the difficult, but humane, path to governing conquered and occupied countries 
overseas. He does not question the underlying will to conquest. 
Counterinsurgency is always an instrument of imperial rule, but its ardent 
proponents set this fact aside. To them, counterinsurgency is simply a mindset 
that commanders need to adopt or a toolkit that soldiers need to master in order 
to do their jobs properly. It is even a kinder, gentler means of rescuing a 
recalcitrant world; a way for the US to police a chaotic planet with a light 
avuncular touch rather than a firm paternal hand. It is a familiar maneuver. The 
prophets of counterinsurgency concentrate on everyday, commonsensical tasks in 
pursuit of unobjectionable goals such as “stability,” “development,” “nation-
building” and “democracy.” The progressive proponents see in it a humanitarian 
style of military intervention. Such aims seem devoid of political or ideological 
content; in fact, all of them have been seen to stand for the purported “end of 
ideology” brought about by US hegemony since the end of World War II.[39] But, 
at a deeper level, their celebratory projections of US managerial prowess—
whether with “oil spots” or accounting ledgers—obscure the broader US ideology 
of domination. 
Population-centric counterinsurgency has been a particularly capacious vessel for 
transmission of a new kind of rule from a distance: ostensibly humanitarian, 
much more reliant on pliant proxies (whether in political or security positions) 
than on gung-ho occupying forces, dependent on a scientific or ethnographic 
knowledge of the natives, and ultimately dismissing the political sentiments 
among the ruled. The effect of the hegemony of the counterinsurgency narratives 
is that the civilian populations are seen as malleable and calculating masses, 
subject to manipulation by the “terrorists” and the counterinsurgents alike, their 
acquiescence necessary for obtaining intelligence and tactical support in the first 
instance and maintaining “stability” in the last. Counterinsurgency is self-
avowedly an update of “dual mandate” methods for our time or, in other words, a 
new managerial handbook of imperial rule. 
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